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Introduction
This is a dispute between neighbors, the Hollands and the Harrisons. The
issues on appeal concern the Hollands’ easement by prescription to use a road to
access their parcel. The road crosses the Harrisons’ parcel, and it is that portion
of the road where the Hollands’ easement is located that is in dispute on appeal.
Under Utah law, one is entitled to a prescriptive easement where the use of
another’s land was open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for 20
years. See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998). The trial court
resolved on summary judgment the issue of whether the Hollands satisfied these
elements, but reserved for the jury the issue of the easement’s scope. The jury
found that the easement is 40 feet wide.
The Harrisons challenge the summary judgment ruling on the ground that
the Hollands’ use was neither continuous nor adverse. And the Harrisons contest
the jury’s finding based on a jury instruction and two evidentiary rulings.
As to the requirement that use be continuous, the Harrisons assert that a
conversation in June 2016 interrupted the Hollands’ use. The Harrisons did not
raise this argument in opposing the motion for summary judgment. Regardless,
the majority rule is that a landowner’s oral objection does not interrupt a
claimant’s adverse use. The court did not err, even if the issue were preserved.
As to the requirement that the use be adverse, the Harrisons assert that a
prior owner of their parcel, Janice, gave permission to the prior owner of the
Hollands’ parcel, Torres, to use the road for the limited purpose of marketing the
1

Torres parcel. But that permission ended when the marketing ended—i.e., when
Torres sold the parcel to the Hollands. The Hollands had no permission to use
the road once they purchased the parcel, and, even if the prior permission
included the Hollands, they never used the road for marketing their parcel.
As to the challenged jury instruction, the Harrisons assert, for the first time
on appeal, that the court erred in instructing the jury to determine the easement’s
scope by finding a width that is “reasonably necessary” for the Hollands to
continue their historic use of the road. The issue is not preserved, and jury
instruction is not erroneous, let alone prejudicial. The scope of an easement is set
by past use. The Harrisons assert only that no Utah case has used this precise
language. This assertion is irrelevant because the particular wording is not
dispositive. And the assertion is incorrect because that language is found in Judd
v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, ¶ 58, 397 P.3d 686.
As to the two evidentiary issues, the Harrisons assert that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of the Hollands’ expert and
excluding the testimony of the Harrisons’ expert. But the court properly allowed
the testimony of the Hollands’ expert because he provided an accurate survey of
the road and drew no legal conclusions for the jury. And the court properly
excluded the testimony of the Harrisons’ expert because his proffered testimony
was cumulative and not rebuttal testimony.
This court should affirm.
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Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Hollands’ use of
the road where it crosses the Harrisons’ parcel was adverse and uninterrupted.
Standard of Review: A summary judgment ruling is reviewed for
correctness, viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600.
Preservation: To the extent the Harrisons challenge the ruling that the
Hollands’ use was uninterrupted during the 20-year period based upon a June
2016 discussion, the issue is not preserved. The Harrisons did not present this
argument to the court in opposing the motion for summary judgment. The
Harrisons first presented this argument in a motion to reconsider. [R.564-76,646.]
And the Harrisons have not challenged the trial court’s refusal to reconsider.
[Op. Br. at 7-8.] Even if they had, the trial court’s decision not to address the
merits of the motion to reconsider is afforded considerable discretion. Tschaggeny
v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ¶ 15, 163 P.3d 615.
The Harrisons did preserve their argument that the Hollands’ use was not
adverse. [R.278-79,523,1372.]
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury to determine
the scope of the easement by reference to the width that is “reasonably
necessary” for the Hollands to continue their historic use of the road.
Standard of Review: This court will review challenges to jury instructions
for correctness. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 14, 29 P.3d 638. “If a party does not
3

object and articulate the grounds with sufficient specificity such that the issue is
presented before the trial court for consideration, that issue cannot be raised on
appeal.” R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 10, 40 P.3d 1119.
Preservation: The Harrisons claim they preserved this issue by submitting
a jury instruction. [Op. Br. at 8,47; R.930.] But when the court held a colloquy
with the attorneys concerning the instruction crafted by the court, the Harrisons’
counsel reported that he was “[l]argely happy” with the instruction and asked
only that the court add one additional line. [R.1749.] The Harrisons’ counsel did
not argue that the instruction was an improper statement of law without the
additional line and did not ask the court to strike anything, including the
“reasonably necessary” language challenged on appeal. [R.1749-51.]
Issue 3: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
testimony from the Hollands’ expert (Mr. Blake).
Issue 4: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
testimony from the Harrisons’ expert (Mr. Bunker).
Standard of Review for Issues 3 and 4: “The trial court has wide
discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.” State v. Larsen,
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). This court will not reverse for an abuse of
discretion “unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.” Id.

4

Statement of the Case
1.

Statement of Facts
The Hollands have used a road that cuts across the Harrisons’ adjoining

parcel since the Hollands purchased their parcel on August 9, 1996. [R.197-98,
533,1509,1527; Add.B.] That day, they crossed the Harrisons’ parcel, pulling a
four-horse trailer, and set up camp on their parcel. [R.197,226,1370,1527.]
When the Hollands acquired their parcel, the Harrisons’ parcel was owned
by Janice,1 who owned all the land in the basin prior to her subdividing the
property. [R.309.] While Janice still owned the Harrisons’ parcel, Janice sold what
would later become the Hollands’ parcel to Torres. [R.50,310.]
Janice gave Torres his parcel, and in exchange Torres built a cabin for
Janice on one of her other parcels. [R.310,1652.] Torres arranged to have the road
cut to take prospective buyers to his parcel. [R.310.] Torres did this without
Janice’s knowledge. [R.310.] Although Janice did not authorize the road in
advance, she subsequently gave Torres temporary permission to use the road for
the limited purpose of marketing his parcel to prospective buyers. [R.310-11.]
Importantly, Janice did not give Torres permission to use the road for
permanent residential access. [R.310-11.] Instead, Janice’s permission to Torres
was temporary and for a limited purpose. [R.310-11.] It was her intention at all

In the record, Janice is known both as “Janice Hawley,” at the time she
subdivided the property, and later by “Janice Kirk Gustafson,” including in her
declaration for this litigation. [R.309; Add.C.]
1

5

times that the roads on the plat map (not the road at issue) were to be used for
permanent access. [R.310.]
Torres sold his parcel to the Hollands about six months after he acquired
it. [R.1509-10.] The road was in place and had been used. [R.198,209,368.] The
road was a single lane, like other roads in the subdivision, but the Hollands
could drive it without any trouble. [R.363,368.] The road looked about the same
as it does in current pictures of the road. [R.198.] The road shown in post-2013
satellite images was “the road that has existed since [the Hollands] first went to
the property” on August 9, 1996. [R.1530.] The road was penciled onto the map
of the subdivision that the Hollands saw prior to purchasing their parcel. [R.195.]
The Hollands did not discuss their right to use the road with Janice, but
Mr. Holland understood from talking to Torres when they purchased that they
were paying more for the parcel than surrounding parcels because of the road
Torres had cut and the power pole he had put in. [R.197-98.]
Janice did not give the Hollands permission to use the road on what would
become the Harrisons’ parcel, but she was aware that the Hollands bought their
parcel and were using the road to access their parcel. [R.197-98,310-11.]
As the Hollands developed their parcel, they had cement and dump trucks
travel the road. [R.1559.] In addition, the Hollands maintained the road on what
would become the Harrisons’ parcel—e.g., by moving rocks, smoothing the road,
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adding gravel, and adding water berms to allow for drainage and thereby
decrease erosion. [R.200,1535-36,1558-60.]
In October of 1997, the Hollands transferred the title for their parcel to
their family limited partnership, SPAH Family Ltd. [R.406-07,1510.]
In 2008, Janice sold to the Harrisons their parcel. [R.11,62.] The Harrisons
built a spur off the road to their cabin, and Mr. Harrison widened the turning
point to allow for clearance when turning the corner to the spur. [R.1530-31,160708.] The Hollands testified that Mr. Harrison widened the turning point for the
spur to his cabin, but that he had done little to the rest of the road. [R.153031,1536-37.] In contrast, Mr. Harrison estimated that the road was 9- to 12-feet
wide when he purchased the parcel, and he testified that the width of the road
was now “upwards of 30 feet wide.” [R.1607-08.]
In addition to using the road on the Harrisons’ parcel, the Harrisons used
the portion of the road extending across the Hollands’ parcel, which is consistent
with an express easement designated on the plat map. [R.522.] The Hollands
placed decorative gates across the road crossing their property. [R.1550-51.]
Mr. Harrison was unhappy with the gates because he disliked getting out to
open them. [R.1554.] After Mr. Holland gave Mr. Harrison permission to unbolt
one of the gates to get some trucks through, he found the gate cut into pieces on
the side of the road, and Mr. Harrison refused to put it back up. [R.1552-53,1560,
1613-16.] Mr. Harrison pushed another gate with his car. [R.1555,1557,1612.]
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In June 2016, Mr. Holland and Mr. Harrison had a verbal disagreement
concerning the road. [R.211,586.] In his deposition, Mr. Holland testified that this
discussion was about the road across the Hollands’ parcel, which is not the
easement at issue in this appeal. [R.211.] He testified Mr. Harrison had
threatened to widen the road on the Hollands’ parcel and tear down the
Hollands’ pump shed in the process. [R.211.]
On September 13, 2016, Mr. Harrison parked a bulldozer to block the
Hollands from using the road to reach their parcel. [R.138,1358.] Ms. Holland
contacted police about Mr. Harrison blocking the road, and then filed the police
statement that mentioned the discussion in June 2016. [R.586,1540.] She said:
“Charlie Harrison and Stan Holland (my husband) argued about rights to an
access road in Willow Basin. Deputy Black called out – talked to both parties.”
[R.586.] The police did not intervene or take any action. [Op. Br. at 23.]
2.

Procedural History
On September 15, 2016, the Harrisons filed this lawsuit, seeking to have

title quieted to the express easement across the road on the Hollands’ parcel—the
easement that is not at issue on appeal. [R.1-5,11,13.] The Harrisons sued the
Hollands for trespass based on the Hollands’ use of the road where it cut across
the Harrisons’ property. [R.14-15.]
The Hollands counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to a prescriptive
easement over the portion of the road on the Harrisons’ parcel, which they had
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been openly using for permanent residential access without interruption for
more than 20 years.2 [R.19-21,23,30.]
The Harrisons filed a motion for summary judgment. [R.173-84,223-245.]
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Harrisons,
ruling that the Harrisons had a 40-foot nonexclusive access easement over the
Hollands’ parcel. [R.521-23.] That ruling is not at issue on appeal.
The Hollands also moved for summary judgment with respect to their use
of the road over the Harrisons’ parcel. The court ruled that the Hollands had
established a prescriptive easement by showing open, continuous, and adverse
use of the road for more than 20 years. [R.523,1365-66,1372.] The trial court
reserved the scope of the Hollands’ prescriptive easement for trial. [R.523.]
The Harrisons filed a motion to reconsider, asserting for the first time that
Ms. Holland’s police statement referring to a discussion in June 2016 was
evidence that the Harrisons had interrupted the Hollands’ use of the road before
the end of the 20 years. [R.564-76.] The court refused to reconsider. [R.646.]
Before trial, the parties submitted proposed instructions and objections.
[R.896-943,1011-16,1017-22,1041-43.] But the instruction at issue on appeal
(Instruction No. 27) was crafted by the court. [R.1011-1016,1749.] During a
colloquy between the court and counsel, the Harrisons’ counsel reported that he

The Hollands also sought compensation for the gates Mr. Harrison had
damaged. [R.31.] The Harrisons do not challenge on appeal the jury’s award of
damages for the gates. [R.1096; Op. Br. at 7-9.]
2
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was “[l]argely happy” with Instruction No. 27. [R.1749.] He asked to have a line
added, but did not ask the court to strike any language (including the
“reasonably necessary” language at issue on appeal); nor did he argue that any
language from the instruction was unsupported by Utah case law. [R.1749-51.]
At trial, the jury heard testimony from various witnesses concerning the
road. The realtor who sold the parcel to the Hollands testified that the road
provided access to the Hollands’ parcel by looping through the Harrisons’ parcel
because of “outcropping of rock or something that they couldn’t get through”
otherwise. [R.1653.] He also testified that the road was cut in the mid-1990s using
a dozer blade that was eight feet wide. [R.1653,1659.] He testified that to cut the
road, the driver had to use the bulldozer the length of the road multiple times,
“[p]robably several times up and back.” [R.1659.] He testified that the road’s
being cut with an eight-foot blade did not make a road eight feet wide, because
“[i]t can take several cuts to put a road in.” [R.1660.]
Prior to the Hollands’ visiting the parcel, a utility pole was placed there.
An employee from Rocky Mountain Power testified that the pole had a tag
indicating placement in 1995. [R.1585,1590-91.] He testified that in 1995 the
power company would have used the same equipment as now to install power
poles. [R.1595-96.] He testified that “the two pieces of equipment that are
absolutely necessary in order to install a power pole” are a “derrick digger,”
used to auger a hole and set the pole in the ground, and a “bucket truck,” used to
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raise the lineman to reach the lines. [R1592-93.] Derrick diggers weigh over
26,000 pounds, are “50-plus foot long” and typically have six wheels. [R.1593.]
Bucket trucks are similarly large pieces of equipment, but vary somewhat in size,
with those at the small end, called squirt booms, weighing under 26,000 pounds,
but still over 10,000 pounds. [R.1594-95.] A helicopter would not have been used
in place of the trucks to place the pole because of the terrain. [R.1597.]
Before trial, the court denied the Harrisons’ motion in limine seeking to
exclude testimony from the Hollands’ expert, Mr. Blake. [R.839.] The court ruled,
“It is plain that the purpose of the survey is to provide the court with the legal
description of a pathway on the ground in the event that the evidence establishes
that there is a legal right of way along that pathway.” [R.839.] “If [the Hollands]
establish the existence of a right of way, it will then be very useful to the court to
have a metes and bounds description of that right of way so that a judgment can
be entered which reduces the likelihood of future litigation.” [R.839.]
At trial, Mr. Blake testified concerning his survey of the road in 2016.
[R.1581.] Mr. Blake testified about how he surveyed the road, including
estimating its edges, mapping points along the road, generating a legal
description, and working backward to estimate the centerline of the road.
[R.1576-79.] He acknowledged that he had not consulted historical photographs
and that he did not “have any information at all” on the road in 1996. [R.1584.]
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The trial court did not permit testimony from the Harrisons’ expert,
Mr. Bunker. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 1-2.] Mr. Bunker did not plan to present a
competing survey or other evidence. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 1.] The expert designation
indicated that the Mr. Bunker would testify as to “the procedure for determining
the location of a prescriptive easement” (rather than the procedure for surveying
a road). [R.664.] The Harrisons’ counsel proffered that the expert would repeat
undisputed facts from the testimony of Mr. Blake (the Hollands’ expert)
including that Mr. Blake did not consult historical photographs in conducting his
survey. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 2-3.] The trial court ruled that the Harrisons’ expert
would not be permitted to testify because his intended testimony “usurped the
Court’s responsibility in instructing the jury.” [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 2.]
3.

Disposition Below
The jury awarded the Hollands a 40-foot easement. [R.1094-95.] The

Harrisons appeal. [R.1299.]
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Summary of the Argument
The Harrisons first assert that the trial court erred in ruling on summary
judgment that the Hollands established uninterrupted adverse use of the road
for a 20-year period. But the undisputed facts establish uninterrupted adverse
use from August 9, 1996, to August 9, 2016.
The Harrisons claim the Hollands’ use was interrupted by a discussion in
June 2016, but they did not present this argument in opposing summary
judgment. They presented this argument only in a motion to reconsider, the
denial of which they have not challenged on appeal.
Even if they had challenged that ruling, the court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to reconsider. In addition, the Harrisons’ argument
concerning the June 2016 discussion fails on its merits. The majority rule is that a
landowner’s filing a lawsuit or physical interference with a claimant’s use of the
land interrupts the adverse use, but an oral objection does not. Consistent with
this, Utah appellate courts have never held that oral objections, even those
clearly evincing an intent to end acquiescence, interrupt adverse use. The cases
cited by the Harrisons do not say otherwise, as they deal with physical barriers.
If this court reaches the merits, it should affirm.
The Harrisons next challenge the summary judgment ruling on the ground
that the Hollands’ use was not adverse because Janice (the prior owner of the
Harrisons’ parcel) gave permission to Torres (the prior owner of the Hollands’
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parcel) to use the road for marketing his parcel. But Janice’s permission and the
permitted use ended when the Hollands acquired title. From that day forward,
the Hollands’ use of the road was adverse.
The Harrisons also challenge the jury determination of the easement’s
scope. The Harrisons first assert that the trial court improperly instructed the
jury to find that the scope of the easement is the width “reasonably necessary”
for the Hollands to continue their historic use of the road. This objection was not
preserved. Regardless, the language is nearly identical to language set forth in
Judd v. Bowen, which quotes prior cases. 2017 UT App 56, ¶ 58, , 397 P.3d 686.
Even if the argument had been preserved, the instruction was not erroneous, and
the Harrisons have demonstrated no prejudice.
Finally, the Harrisons challenge two evidentiary rulings. The Harrisons
assert that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of the
Hollands’ expert and excluding the testimony of the Harrisons’ expert. But the
court properly allowed the testimony of the Hollands’ expert because he
provided an accurate survey of the road and drew no legal conclusions for the
jury. And the court properly excluded the testimony of the Harrisons’ expert
because his proffered testimony was cumulative and not rebuttal testimony.
This court should affirm.

14

Argument
1.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Hollands’ Adverse Use of the
Road Satisfied the 20-Year Prescriptive Period
The Hollands’ use of the road was both adverse and uninterrupted for

more than 20 years. Under Utah law, “[a] party claiming a prescriptive easement
must prove that his use of another’s land was open, continuous, and adverse
under a claim of right for a period of twenty years.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998). The Hollands began using the road, without
permission, when they acquired title on August 9, 1996, and continued to use the
road through August 9, 2016. [R.196-98,202-03,208,211.] A month later, in
September 2016, the Harrisons filed a lawsuit and blocked the road, but it was
too late. [R.1-5,138,202-03.]
1.1

The court correctly ruled that the Harrisons did not interrupt the
20-year period

The Harrisons argue that they interrupted the 20-year period with a verbal
discussion in June 2016. [Op. Br. at 34-35.] The argument fails for a number of
reasons, some procedural and some on the merits.
1.1.1

The Harrisons do not appeal from the order denying the
motion to reconsider, the order addressing their argument
on appeal

The Harrisons argue that a discussion between the parties in June 2016
interrupted the 20-year period before it ended. The argument is not properly
before the court, and in any event, the Harrisons are incorrect on the merits.
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This court should decline to consider the argument. In opposing summary
judgment, the Harrisons did not raise the June 2016 discussion or argue that it
interrupted the prescriptive period. Instead, they raised this argument for the
first time in their motion to reconsider. [R.564-76.] The trial court refused to
reconsider. [R.646.] On appeal, the Harrisons have not challenged the trial court’s
refusal to reconsider, and therefore have not challenged the applicable order
concerning the June 2016 discussion. [R.646; Op. Br. at 7-8, 33-35.]
Because they have not appealed from the order on the motion for
reconsideration, the Harrisons have not addressed the applicable standard of
review or demonstrated an abuse of discretion. [Op. Br. at 7-8.] Trial courts have
discretion to refuse to reconsider, except “(1) when there has been an intervening
change of authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when
the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
work a manifest injustice.” McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2013 UT 20, ¶ 24, 299 P.3d 1139
(internal quotation marks omitted). Absent these limited circumstances, the
court’s ruling will not be overturned unless “there is no reasonable basis for the
decision.” Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ¶ 16, 163 P.3d 615 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Harrisons did not argue below or in the opening brief that the trial
court was required to reconsider its summary judgment ruling. To the contrary,
the Harrisons informed the court that it had discretion to consider their motion,
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but was not required to do so. [R.607.] The Harrisons initially sought to persuade
the court to exercise its discretion in their favor by asserting that they had not
received the sheriff’s report containing Ms. Holland’s statement until after the
summary judgment ruling. [R.566,569.] But when the Hollands pointed out that
the June 2016 discussion was not newly discovered evidence, the Harrisons
conceded that “before the summary judgment motion was argued” they were
aware of the “June 2016 face-off” and that law enforcement was summoned.
[R.606.] The Harrisons stated that “[w]hether or not the sheriff’s report is ‘new
evidence’ . . . misses the point,” because rule 54(b) “permits a court to revisit and
revise any interim order before final judgment” and “that right is entirely
discretionary with the court.” [R.607 (emphasis added).] The Harrisons do not
challenge on appeal the trial court’s refusal to reconsider. [Op. Br. at 7-8; R.1299.].
The operative order denying the motion to reconsider is therefore not
before this court, and even if it were, it would be reviewed for abuse of
discretion. McLaughlin, 2013 UT 20, ¶ 22; Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, ¶ 16. The
Harrisons have not argued the court abused its discretion by refusing to
reconsider. This court should decline to consider the argument.
1.1.2

The Harrisons have not demonstrated that the trial court
applied the wrong legal standard

Even if the June 2016 discussion had been properly raised, the Harrisons
have demonstrated no error. In discussing whether an oral objection could
interrupt adverse use, the trial court was correct in saying that “forbidding the
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use has no legal affect at all.”3 [R.1372.] To the contrary, as the court noted,
objecting to the use is what makes the use adverse, and therefore, “forbidding
them [would] start the period running if it hadn’t already started.” [R.1366.]
The trial court’s ruling is in accord with a majority of jurisdictions. And the
majority rule comports with Utah case law and the doctrine of prescriptive
easement. Under the majority rule, a landowner must file a lawsuit or physically
interfere with the adverse use. Indeed, most jurisdictions require “actual physical
interference with the claimant’s use,” “in such a way as to prevent, at least
temporarily, the adverse use.” Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of
Easements & Licenses in Land, § 5:16 (2019). [Add.E.] “It is not sufficient merely to
attempt an interruption or to render the use less convenient. The obstruction
must in fact interfere with the claimant’s usage.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
The Harrisons acknowledge “[t]he weight of authority is . . . that mere
remonstrances or protests by the landowner will not prevent the acquisition of a

In the summary judgment proceedings, Mr. Harrison asserted in his
affidavit that he had notified the Hollands, “well before August 1 of 2016, that
we forbad Defendants’ use of the roadway,” but he provided no specifics.
[R.304,1365.] To overcome summary judgment, an affidavit “must set forth
specific facts that would be admissible in evidence.” Smith v. Four Corners Mental
Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 50, 70 P.3d 904 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A “bare assertion[]” is “insufficient to create an issue of fact.” Anderton v. Boren,
2017 UT App 232, ¶ 28, 414 P.3d 508. On appeal, the Harrisons have not argued
that the trial court’s ruling was wrong in light of Mr. Harrison’s bare assertion
that he “forbade” the use. [Op. Br. at 16.] Issues “not presented in the opening
brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court.”
Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
any event, for the reasons set forth in this section, the trial court was correct in
ruling that Mr. Harrison’s forbidding the use had no legal effect. [R.1366,1372.]
3
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right by prescription, in the absence of any physical interference with the user, or
legal proceedings based thereon.” [Op. Br. at 39 (quoting 4 Tiffany on Real
Property (2017 ed.), § 1206).] This rule makes sense, as a landowner’s objection or
“complaints may strengthen the conclusion that the claimant’s use was hostile.”
The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land, § 5:16.
This court has previously treated a claimant’s persistent use in the face of a
landowner’s opposition as evidence of adverse use, not interruption. This court
upheld a determination that a grazing association’s use of a road was adverse “in
view of the association president’s insistence during the 1950’s that they had a
right to use the trail and would force their way through if necessary and in view
of the testimony that the association riders in fact forced their way through the
fence or gate when they did not have a key during the period from 1950 to 1980.”
Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah 1984).
Although Crane did not directly address the question before this court, it is
consistent with the majority rule that actual interruption is necessary to interrupt
adverse use. The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land, § 5:16. It also supports that a
landowner’s ineffective opposition, such as oral objections, is evidence of
adverseness rather than interruption. Id.
This approach makes sense in light of the doctrine of prescriptive
easement. A claimant’s use is either under the landowner (permissive) or against
the landowner (adverse). Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537 (1953). If the use is by
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permission, the landowner may generally revoke the license at any time.
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.16 (2000). But where the use is
adverse, further objections only reinforce the fact that the use is adverse.
The majority rule makes sense and is not called into question by any of the
four cases cited by the Harrisons. The issue ruled on in the four cases was not
whether an oral objection interrupts the prescriptive period, but whether
ineffective physical barriers interrupt the prescriptive period. In each case, the
courts determined that the landowner’s conduct, which included repeatedly
erecting physical barriers, was sufficient to interrupt the period even if the
claimant circumvented the barriers. Allen v. Thomas, 209 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2006); Pittman v. Lowther, 610 S.E.2d 479, 481-82 (S.C. 2005); Kelley v.
Westover, 938 S.W.2d 235, 235-37 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997); Rice v. Miller, 238 N.W.2d
609, 611 (Minn. 1976).
None of the Harrisons’ cases hold that a single oral objection interrupts the
prescriptive period. Nor do they express relevant policy considerations. The
Harrisons argue that this court should avoid a “law of the range mentality”
urging “self-help remedies” that “compel[] landowners to engage in potentiallyviolent confrontations, as a prerequisite to the defense of property rights.” [Op.
Br. at 38.] The Harrisons quote one of their cases as being in favor of a rule that
“will serve to discourage the type of violent confrontations that could result from
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forcing a property owner to ‘successfully’ defend his right to keep others off of
his land.” [Op. Br. at 37 (quoting Allen, 209 S.W.3d at 481).]
But in that case, that court was not suggesting that a rule requiring the
landowner to erect a physical barrier or initiate a lawsuit could result in violent
confrontations; the court was suggesting that requiring landowners to do more
than erecting physical barriers—perhaps defend the barriers—could lead to
violent confrontations. Allen, 209 S.W.3d at 481; see also Pittman, 610 S.E.2d at 481.
An oral objection is not sufficient to interrupt a prescriptive period.
Instead, it confirms that the use is adverse. Even if the argument concerning
interruption were preserved, this court should affirm.
1.1.3

The record does not indicate that the Harrisons took overt
action clearly evincing an intent to end their acquiescence

Even if this court were to reach the issue and adopt the rule urged by the
Harrisons that an oral objection “clearly evincing an intent to end . . .
acquiescence” should be deemed to interrupt a claimant’s use [Op. Br. at 38], the
record does not indicate that the Harrisons made such an objection.
The Harrisons base their argument on Ms. Holland’s police statement,
which said: “Charlie Harrison and Stan Holland (my husband) argued about
rights to an access road in Willow Basin. Deputy Black called out – talked to both
parties.” [R.586.] The only evidence this provides concerning the Harrisons’
conduct is that Mr. Harrison “argued” about “an access road.” [R.586.]
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In their briefing, the Harrisons state that “the Harrisons . . . summoned law
enforcement to prevent Hollands’ use of the road” and that “[b]ased on Page
Holland’s account in the Sheriff’s Report, it is clear that in June 2016 . . . Charlie
Harrison and Stan Holland had a confrontation on the property in which
Mr. Harrison challenged Mr. Holland’s use of the road.” [Op. Br. at 23, 34.] But
Ms. Holland did not state that the Harrisons summoned law enforcement to
prevent the Hollands’ use of the road; she did not identify who summoned law
enforcement or the road about which the parties argued. [R.586.]
Without any support, the Harrisons assert that “the Harrisons timely
challenged the Hollands’ continued trespass onto the Harrison parcel for any
purpose by notifying Hollands that Harrisons did not acquiescence in that use
and calling the Grand County Sheriff’s office to remedy the situation.” [Op. Br. at
57.] The Harrisons suggest that based on Ms. Holland’s police statement, “As of
June 2016, there could be no doubt that the Harrisons did not acquiescence in the
Hollands’ continued use of the Harrisons’ property.” [Op. Br. at 39.] But
Ms. Holland’s police statement that the parties “argued” about an access road
does not support the Hollands’ characterization, and the Harrisons do not point
to any other record support. [R.586.]
Mr. Harrison was a party to the June 2016 discussion. But Mr. Harrison
provided no account of that conversation. Mr. Holland testified about the June
2016 discussion in his deposition, explaining that the discussion was about
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Mr. Harrison’s threatening to knock down the Hollands’ pump house in order to
widen the road on the Hollands’ parcel to the full 40 feet designated on the plat
map. [R.751.] In other words, the discussion was about the Harrisons’ express
easement over the Hollands’ parcel; it was not about the easement at issue on
appeal—the Hollands’ easement over the Harrisons’ parcel. [R.598,751.]
Ms. Holland’s secondhand police statement does not contradict
Mr. Holland’s deposition testimony or create a disputed issue of fact. She
testified that the two men argued about “an access road in Willow Basin” and
“Deputy Black called out—talked to both parties.” [R.586.] Thus, the trial court
was presented with undisputed testimony from the Hollands that the discussion
in June 2016 was about the road on the Hollands’ parcel, not on the Harrisons’
parcel.
This court has three ways to affirm. This court should not address whether
the June 2016 discussion interrupted the prescriptive period because the issue is
not properly before the court. If the court does address it, the court should adopt
the majority rule that supports the Hollands’ position that verbal discussions do
not interrupt the period. And if the court does not adopt the majority rule, the
court should hold that the record does not support a verbal interruption here.
1.2

The Hollands’ use of the road was adverse

The Harrisons also argue that the Hollands’ use of the road was not
adverse based on a temporary limited permission that Janice (the prior owner of

23

the Harrisons’ parcel) gave to Torres (the prior owner of the Hollands’ parcel)
[Op. Br. at 43; R.310-11.] This argument, while preserved, also fails.
Regardless of whether Torres’ use was permissive, the undisputed
evidence demonstrates that the Hollands’ use was adverse from the day they
acquired title because their use was inconsistent with the permission granted by
Janice to Torres. Where a landowner has given license for the property’s use, and
the licensee’s use is consistent with that license, the use will not be presumed to
be adverse. Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537–38 (Utah 1953). But adverse use
can be demonstrated by showing a use that is inconsistent with the license. Id.
Where “the use is in fact adverse and appears to be so, that is all that is required”
to demonstrate adverse use. Richins v. Struhs, 412 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1966).
Here, Janice gave Torres permission to use the road “not as permanent
access to Parcel A,” but “to take prospective purchasers to the property for
marketing purposes.” [R.310-11.] While the Harrisons concede that Janice gave
Torres permission only “for the use specified,” they nonetheless assert that the
Harrisons’ general use of the road was permissive while Janice owned the parcel.
[Op. Br. at 43.] But the “use specified” was for Torres to “take prospective
purchasers to the property for marketing purposes,” a use that ended as soon as
Torres sold his parcel to the Hollands. [R.310-11.]
The Harrisons assert that “[t]he Hollands made no showing whatsoever of
a point in time at which their permitted use of a limited temporary access road
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became adverse, as required by governing case law.” [Op Br. at 43.] But the
Hollands’ use of the road for permanent access to their parcel is a use Janice
never intended or permitted. [R.310-11.] The Hollands’ use was adverse from the
day they acquired title on August 9, 1996.
After closing on August 9, 1996, the Hollands used the road to pull a fourhorse trailer to their parcel and set up camp. [R.197,226,1370.] The Hollands
continued using the road “all the time from then on,” including driving the road
with a Jeep, a Lincoln, trucks, campers, and trailers. [R.197-99,203,226,363,368,
1370.] They also maintained the road by adding gravel and water berms, as if
they had a right to continue using it. [R.199.] Indeed, the Hollands thought they
had a right to use the road. The realtor who took them to the parcel showed them
a plat map with the road penciled in, and they understood from Torres that their
parcel cost more than other parcels because of the road. [R.195,197.]
Janice knew when the Hollands purchased the parcel and was aware that
they were using the road. [R.197-98.] It would have been obvious to Janice from
August 9, 1996, onward that the Hollands were using the road for a purpose she
had not authorized. Janice could have ended the Hollands’ use, but never did.
Neither did the Harrisons once they purchased the property until expiration of
the 20-year period. The Hollands’ use was inconsistent with Janice’s permission
from the beginning and therefore was both “adverse” and “appeared to be
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[adverse],” which satisfies the test for adverse use for a prescriptive easement.
Richins, 412 P.2d at 316.
The trial court correctly ruled that the Hollands’ use was adverse.
2.

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury
The Harrisons also challenge the jury’s determination of the scope of the

easement based upon the wording of a jury instruction. The challenged
instruction, Instruction No. 27, states:
You should determine what is reasonably necessary,
from the facts and circumstances of this case, for SPAH
and the Hollands to access their property, taking into
account the historic use and shape of the road during its
20 years of use. You may express your decision in terms
of the survey, or by determining the width of the
easement.
[R.1085; Op. Br. at 47.] On appeal, the Harrisons take issue with the “reasonably
necessary” language in the instruction. [Op. Br. at 47-48.] But the Harrisons did
not preserve this issue, and even if they had, the instruction is correct.
2.1

The Harrisons did not preserve their objection to the jury
instruction

Before addressing the merits, the Hollands show that the jury instruction
issue is not preserved and is inadequately briefed.
As background, after the parties submitted proposed instructions and
objections, the court crafted Instruction No. 27. During a colloquy between the
court and counsel discussing the instruction, the Harrisons’ counsel reported that
he was “[l]argely happy” with Instruction No. 27. [R.1749; Add.D.] Counsel
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asked to have a sentence added to the instruction,4 but counsel did not otherwise
object to the instruction. [R.1749-51.]
But counsel did not just fail to object. When the trial court explained the
instruction properly asked the jury to “tak[e] into account the historic use and
shape of the road during its 20 years of use,” the Harrisons counsel agreed that “it
covers the substance of it,” although counsel again requested the additional
sentence. [R.1750.] Indeed, in objecting to a different proposed jury instruction
(which was not given at trial), the Harrisons endorsed the “reasonably
necessary” language by asserting that the proposed instruction “disregards
recent law concerning the limitation of prescriptive easements to that reasonably
necessary for historic use.” [R.1041 (emphasis added).]
Because the Harrisons did not preserve their objection to the jury
instruction, and indeed invited any error, this court should decline to address the
issue on appeal. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 10, 40 P.3d 1119.
In addition, this court should decline to address the argument because the
Harrisons do not attempt to demonstrate that the “reasonably necessary”
language is inconsistent with Utah law. Instead, the Harrisons assert that the
language does not appear in Utah case law. But this is incorrect.

Counsel requested that the court add the sentence, “The general rule is that
the extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and limited by its historic use
during the prescriptive period.” [R.1749.]
4
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In Judd v. Bowen, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that “the ‘purpose for
which the easement was acquired’ limits both the extent of the easement right
granted as well as the physical boundaries of the easement itself.” 2017 UT App
56, ¶ 58, 397 P.3d 686 (quoting Whitesides v. Green, 44 P. 1032, 1033 (Utah 1896)).
The court then used the language included in the instruction here: the scope of
an easement is a “‘question of reasonable necessity.’” Id. (quoting Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946)). “And what is
reasonably necessary to effectuate the prescriptive right ‘must be determined
from a consideration of the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case.’” Id.
(quoting Whitesides, 44 P. at 1033).
The trial court’s language does stem from Utah case law. And that case law
has been endorsed by this court, albeit indirectly. The Harrisons fail to recognize
this because they misunderstand Judd. The Harrisons claim that, in Judd, “the
court of appeals reversed the trial court’s finding and order as they related to the
widths of the claimants’ prescriptive rights, holding that ‘these orders were
inconsistent with the usage that forms the basis of the Judd’s prescriptive right—
using the Driveway for ingress and egress purposes.’” [Op. Br. at 46-47.]
But the court of appeals’ decision did not concern the width of the
prescriptive easement. Its decision concerned the trial court’s order that the
landowner remove a walkway and decorative border. Id. ¶ 64. The court of
appeals held that “[t]hese orders are inconsistent with the usage that forms the
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basis of the Judds’ prescriptive right—using the Driveway for ingress and egress
purposes” because “neither the walkway nor the decorative border impedes the
Judds from using the Driveway for access purposes.” Id. ¶ 65. The court of
appeals went on to “vacate the [trial] court’s orders that the Bowens remove the
decorative rock border and the walkway as those orders do not appear to be
reasonably necessary to the Judds’ enjoyment of their access easement.” Id. ¶ 69.
This court granted certiorari in Judd v. Bowen on the questions of “whether
the court of appeals erred in its construction and application of the elements of
the legal standard for establishing a prescriptive easement for access” and
“whether the court of appeals erred in its ruling concerning the scope of the
easement.” Judd v. Bowen, 2018 UT 47, ¶ 8, 428 P.3d 1032. This court subsequently
dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted because “the court of appeals’
decision is not in conflict with any prior court of appeals decision or any decision
of this court”; the court “relied upon well-established case law from both this
court and the court of appeals”; its “decision did not alter or amend the
standard”; and the court’s “application of these principles was in conformity
with Utah Supreme Court and court of appeals caselaw.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 12-13.
“Nothing the court of appeals did was unusual.” Id. ¶ 13.
The trial court correctly relied upon the language in Judd. Regardless, the
Harrisons have not explained how the language is inconsistent with Utah law, let

29

alone how Judd was wrongly decided. This court should decline to address the
issue as unpreserved and inadequately briefed.
2.2

The jury instruction was correct

Instruction No. 27 is also correct. All parties agree that the scope of the
easement is determined by historic use. And the jury instruction reflects the fact
that the scope of the easement here was determined by its historic use.
Indeed, the Harrisons never explain the difference between Instruction
No. 27 and the instruction they prefer. Instruction No. 27 defines the width of the
easement as the width reasonably necessary to continue the historic use. The
instruction the Harrisons prefer defines the width of the easement by the historic
use. The Harrisons’ argument is that the trial court erred in failing to use
different words that mean the same thing.
Without explanation, the Harrisons complain that the instruction told the
jury to disregard the evidence in support of the Harrisons’ favored outcome.
[Op. Br. at 47-48.] But the instruction told the jury to “determine what is
reasonably necessary . . . for SPAH and the Hollands to access their property.”
[R.1085.] And the instruction told the jury to base that determination on “the
facts and circumstances of the case . . . taking into account the historic use and
shape of the road during its 20 years of use.” [R.1085.] Accordingly, in addition
to failing to show that the reasonably necessary standard is unsupported by Utah
law, the Harrisons have also failed to show any legal error in the instruction.
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The Harrisons also appear to misunderstand the facts of the case. The
Harrisons state that “it was established . . . that, 20 years before this action
started, the road across the Harrison parcel was a single blade, or 8 feet, in
width.” [Op. Br. at 47.] But the evidence established that, while the width of the
dozer blade used to cut the road was eight feet, it takes “several cuts to get the
road in.” [R.1659-60.] The evidence also established that prior to the Hollands’
beginning their use, a power pole had been placed on the Hollands’ parcel, and
placement of the pole would have required large power trucks to traverse the
road to reach the site. [R.1592-97.]
In any event, the relevant question is not the width of the actual road, but
the Hollands’ historic use. The Hollands’ “historic use” of the road was their use
“during the prescriptive period,” which was from 1996 to 2016. Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). Their historic use was using the road to
access their parcel with their large vehicles, including the Jeep, truck, tent trailer,
horse trailer, and fifth-wheel trailer, as well as the cement trucks, dump trucks,
and bobtail trucks used to develop their property. [R.1527-28,1534,1545-46,1559,
1568.]
The Harrisons also wrongly assert that “[n]o competent evidence of any
sort was offered of [the road’s] original course.” [Op. Br. at 47.] But again, the
relevant question is the Hollands’ historic use during the prescriptive period.
Ms. Holland testified that they had used the road on the Harrisons’ parcel to
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access their parcel from August 9, 1996 to the present, and that the road shown in
post-2013 satellite images was “the road that has existed since we first went to
the property.” [R.1526-27,1530.] Mr. Blake surveyed the course of that road.
[R.1576.] The Harrisons did not present evidence to contradict Ms. Holland’s
testimony or demonstrate that the course ever changed.
The Harrisons’ argument is not preserved, fails to demonstrate an error,
and mischaracterizes the record. And even if there were an error, the Harrisons
have not carried their burden to show prejudice. This court should affirm.
3.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Testimony
from the Hollands’ Expert
The Hollands’ expert (Mr. Blake) surveyed the road in 2016 and testified as

to his survey. The Harrisons assert that his testimony should have been excluded
as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under rule 403, as well as unreliable under
rule 702(b). [Op. Br. at 51-55.] The Harrisons are incorrect.
3.1

Mr. Blake’s testimony was relevant and not unduly prejudicial

The Harrisons argue that Mr. Blake’s testimony was irrelevant because
“the location of the road in 2016 is of no consequence in determining the scope of
a prescriptive right.” [Op. Br. at 53-54.] But evidence is relevant if “it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and “the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Utah R. Evid. 401. The rules of evidence “establish a
very low bar that deems even evidence with the slightest probative value
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relevant and presumptively admissible.” State v. Richardson, 2013 UT 50, ¶ 24, 308
P.3d 526 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Blake’s survey was relevant evidence. As the court said in denying the
Harrisons’ motion in limine, “It is plain that the purpose of the survey is to
provide the court with the legal description of a pathway on the ground in the
event that the evidence establishes that there is a legal right of way along that
pathway.” [R.839.]
Ms. Holland testified that they had used the road on the Harrisons’ parcel
to access their parcel from August 9, 1996 to the present, and that the road shown
in post-2013 satellite images was “the road that has existed since we first went to
the property.” [R.1526-1530.] Mr. Blake’s survey in 2016 therefore reflects the
road as it existed during the prescriptive period. [R.1576.] While witnesses
differed regarding whether the road had been widened before or during the
prescriptive period, and if so, how much or what portions of the road had been
widened, the jury was entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses. The
survey was relevant to the jury given their credibility determinations. The court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony about the survey.
Mr. Blake’s relevant testimony also was not unduly prejudicial. The
Harrisons claim that Mr. Blake’s testimony should have been excluded as unduly
prejudicial because the jury received “testimony regarding the location of the
easement’s supposed historic centerline, which they clearly took as gospel.” [Op.
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Br. at 54.] But Mr. Blake never purported to testify to a “historic centerline.” His
testimony was limited to describing the process by which he surveyed the road
in 2016, estimated the edges of the dirt road, created a legal description, and
worked backwards from the description to estimate a centerline. [R.1577-79.] He
informed the jury that he had not looked at historical photographs of the road,
had not seen the road in the past, and did not “have any information at all on
where that road went or how big it was in 1996.” [R.1583-84.]
Mr. Blake’s testimony was relevant and not prejudicial.
3.2

Mr. Blake’s testimony was reliable

The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mr. Blake to
testify as an expert. Under rule 702(b), the principles and methods underlying
Mr. Blake’s testimony were reliable, based on sufficient facts or data, and were
reliably applied to the facts. The Harrisons have not shown otherwise. To the
contrary, they effectively concede all three prongs are met under 702(b).
Rule 702(b) provides that expert testimony is admissible if “the principles
or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based
upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.”
Utah R. Evid. 702(b). The Harrisons acknowledge that they “did not challenge
Mr. Blake’s credentials as a land surveyor; nor did they contend that his survey
methodology was flawed or incorrectly performed.” [Op. Br. at 52.] Thus, the
“principles and methods” underlying Mr. Blake’s testimony are “reliable” and
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“based upon sufficient facts or data,” and therefore satisfy the first two prongs
under 702(b). [Op. Br. at 52.]
The Harrisons suggest that Mr. Blake’s principles and methods have not
been reliably applied to the facts of the case. [Op. Br. at 52.] They argue that for
purposes of a prescriptive easement, Mr. Blake measured “the wrong thing” by
measuring the road as it existed in 2016. [Op. Br. at 52-53.] They claim he
improperly calculated the centerline of the “easement” and failed to establish
“the historic, 20-year long use of the easement.” [Op. Br. at 53.]
But the Harrisons misunderstand Mr. Blake’s testimony. Mr. Blake did not
survey the “easement.” Mr. Blake surveyed the road. He testified that he
“surveyed the road that [sic] - - - way that goes through the Harrison property.”
[R.1576.] And he described to the jury the process of measuring and surveying
the road that was physically present on the parcel when he visited. [R.1576-59.]
The Harrisons concede that Mr. Blake correctly and accurately performed this
survey. [Op. Br. at 52.] It was for the jury to weigh Mr. Blake’s testimony
regarding the survey of the road, along with all the other trial testimony, in
determining the scope of the easement.
Mr. Blake’s “principles and methods” were “reliably applied to the facts”
because his survey of the road was accurate, as the Harrisons concede. [Op. Br. at
52.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mr. Blake’s testimony.
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4.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding Testimony
from the Harrisons’ Expert
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony

from the Harrisons’ expert (Mr. Bunker). This court “grant[s] a trial court broad
discretion to admit or exclude evidence” and will “not reverse a trial court’s
ruling on evidence unless the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability.”
Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, ¶ 43, 221 P.3d 205 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Bunker’s proffered testimony was not rebuttal testimony. “Rebuttal
evidence is evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or
nullify the effect of the opponent’s evidence.” Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338
(Utah 1993). Mr. Bunker sought to testify that “Mr. Blake’s survey was not based
on historic use of the easement claimed by Defendants, but was formulated by
(1) measuring the edges of the road across the Plaintiff’s property as it existed in
October 2016, and (2) establishing a centerline of that road by ‘eyeballing a midpoint line.” [Op. Br. Add 3 at 1-2.] But Mr. Blake testified to these facts and never
represented anything to the contrary. [R.1576-79,1584.] Because Mr. Bunker’s
proffered testimony would have “wast[ed] time” and “needlessly present[ed]
cumulative evidence,” the court’s ruling excluding it was not beyond the limits
of reasonability. Utah R. Evid. 403; Ferguson, 2009 UT 49, ¶ 43.
For the same reason, the Harrisons have not shown prejudice. As
Mr. Bunker’s proffered testimony merely repeated facts already testified to by
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Mr. Blake, his testimony was “sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the case.” Armed Forces Ins.
Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 22, 70 P.3d 35 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
Finally, the Harrisons do not challenge the trial court’s ruling that
Mr. Bunker’s testimony would usurp the court’s responsibility in instructing the
jury. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 2.] ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT
24, ¶ 16, 309 P.3d 201. Mr. Bunker’s expert designation stated that Mr. Bunker
would testify “to the procedure for determining the location of a prescriptive
easement.” [R.664.] Unlike the physical existence of the road, the doctrine of
prescriptive easement is a matter of property law, and the procedure for
determining the location or scope of a prescriptive easement is a legal question.
See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998).
The Utah Rules of Evidence do not permit a witness to “give legal
conclusions,” which create “a danger that a juror may turn to the expert rather
than the judge for guidance on the applicable law.” Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt.
Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347-48 (Utah 1993). For that reason, the court of appeals
has noted that experts should not be permitted to “tie their opinions to the
requirements of Utah law.” Colosimo v. Gateway Cmty. Church, 2016 UT App 195,
¶ 33, 382 P.3d 667 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff’d, 2018 UT
26, 424 P.3d 866. The Harrisons have failed to demonstrate that Mr. Bunker’s
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testimony would not have usurped the court’s responsibility in instructing the
jury. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 2.]
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mr. Bunker’s
testimony, and the Harrisons have not shown any prejudice.
Conclusion
The Harrisons have not demonstrated that the trial court erred in its partial
summary judgment ruling, instruction of the jury, or evidentiary rulings. This
court should affirm the lower court’s rulings.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2019.
ZIMMERMAN BOOHER

/s/ Freyja R. Johnson
Troy L. Booher
Freyja R. Johnson
Attorneys for Appellees SPAH Family
Ltd., Stan E. Holland, and Page Holland
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Certificate of Compliance
I hereby certify that:
1.

This brief complies with the word limits set forth in Utah R. App. P.

24(g)(1) because this brief contains 9,443 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(g)(2).
2.

This brief complies with Utah R. App. P. 21(g) regarding public and

non-public filings.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Freyja R. Johnson
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Certificate of Service
This is to certify that on the 17th day of April, 2019, I caused two true and
correct copies of the Brief of Appellees to be served via first-class mail, postage
prepaid, with a copy by email, on:
Vincent C. Rampton
Jessica P. Wilde
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
vrampton@joneswaldo.com
jwilde@joneswaldo.com
Attorneys for Appellants Charlie W. Harrison and Trena Harrison

/s/ Freyja R. Johnson

40

Addendum A

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: October 23, 2017
/s/ LYLE R ANDERSON
02:33:31 PM
District Court Judge

Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684)
Jessica P. Wilde (USB 11801)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.
170 South Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801-521-3200
Email: vrampton@joneswaldo.com
jwilde@joneswaldo.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHARLIE W. HARRISON and TRENA
HARRISON,
ORDER CONTINUING PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE, DENYING
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND
SETTING HEARING ON MOTION
TO EXCLUDE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SPAH FAMILY, LTD; STAN E. HOLLAND;
and PAIGE HOLLAND,

Civil No. 160700035
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

Based on the stipulation and joint motion of the parties, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. That the pretrial scheduling conference in the above-entitled matter currently set for 9
a.m. on October 24, 2017, be and hereby is continued to November 14, 2017, at 9:00 am.
2. That Plaintiffs’ pending Motion to Reconsider Order of Summary Judgment
(Defendants’ Claim of Easement by Prescription), is hereby denied, and Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Exclude Defendants’ Expert Witnesses, will be heard on November 14, 2017, at 9:00 am.

1
1392450.1

000646
October 23, 2017 02:33 PM

1 of 2

END OF ORDER
Effective when digitally executed by the Court, above

2
1392450.1

000647
October 23, 2017 02:33 PM
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Addendum B

Addendum C

Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684)
Jessica P. Wilde(USB 11801)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.
170 South Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801-521-3200
Email: vramplon(a.1joncswaldo.rnm
jwildc(i]1jonc~,valdo.com
Attorneys.f<1r Plaintf[f.i/

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHARLIE W. 'HARRISON and TRENA
HARRISON,

Plainli ffs,

J)ECLARATION OF .JANICE KIRK
GUSTAFSON

vs.

SPAH FAMILY, LTD; STAN E. HOLLAND;
and PAIGE HOLLAND,

Civil No. 160700035
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

I

Defendants.

I

i

STATE OF ARIZONA

)
) ss.
COlJNTY 01' lvtARICOPA )

II
I
i

I

1, JANICE KIRK GUSTAFSON, hereby declare as follows:

1.

I

I am an individual over the age of 21 years and am competent to testil) as lo the
1

mailers set out herein.
2.

I was at one time the owner of all prnperty located within what is now known as

Willow Basin Subdivision in Grand County, State of Utah, which I held and owned in the name
of Janice Hawley.

26632.000,I
127,1600.1

000309

I

3.

I authorized the preparation by Keogh Land Surveying of a subdivision plat of

Willow Basin Subdivision in November of 1994.
4.

As illustrated by Keogh Land Surveying, the subdivision consisted of eight lots,

each accessible by roads drawn within the subdivision, all as reflected on the subdivision plat
attached to this Declaration as Exhibit 1.
5.

It was at all times my intention that the lots within the subdivision be accessed by

the roads shown on the plat map.
6.

After Willow Basin Subdivision was approved by necessary government agencies,

I retained Randy Day and Raymond Tibbetts of Canyon County Realty to list and market the lots
therein.
7.

I thereafter entered into an agreement with Manuel and Ginger Torres under

which I conveyed my right, title and interest in and to Parcel A of the subdivision to the Torreses
in exchange for Manuel Torres' construction of a cabin for me on Parcel G, a title which I
retained.
8.

I became aware that, at some time before or after the summer of 1996 (during

which I was in Moab and would have known of its creation had it been during that time), Manuel
Torres arranged for the grading of a narrow road connecting Parcel A with adjacent roads by
means of a road looping over Parcel H (a title to which I had retained).
9.

It was my understanding that the purpose of the road crossing Parcel H was not as

pennanent access to Parcel A, but as a means of permitting Manuel and Ginger Torres to talce
prospective purchasers to the property for marketing purposes.

2
1274600.1

000310

10.

While I neither knew of nor authorized the creation of the road in advance, its use

thereafter for the purpose stated at paragraph 9 was pursuant to permission from me.
I declare under the perjury laws of the State of Utah and the United States of America
that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this _ _ day of May 2017.

I
I

·I

3
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May 15, 2018

Harrison v. Spah Family
Jury Trial
Page 267
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, MOAB

GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

-o0o-

CHARLIE W. HARRISON and

)

TRENA HARRISON,

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

Case No. 160700035

)
vs.

)

JURY TRIAL

)
SPAH FAMILY LTD, STAN E.

)

HOLLAND and PAIGE HOLLAND,

)

(Volume Two)

)
Defendants.

)

-o0o-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of May, 2018,
commencing at the hour of 8:09 a.m., the above-entitled matter
came on for further hearing before the HONORABLE LYLE R.

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188
001735

May 15, 2018

Harrison v. Spah Family
Jury Trial
Page 281

1

Rogers?

You're--you're comfortable with the say it is?

2

MS. ROGERS:

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. ROGERS:

5

THE COURT:

6

something to No. 27?

It's fine.
Okay.
It's fine.
And--but you still want me to do

7

MS. ROGERS:

No.

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MS. ROGERS:

Just leave it like it is.

10

MR. RAMPTON:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. RAMPTON:

Could I speak to No. 27, your Honor?

Yes.
Largely happy.

I would ask that the

13

second paragraph commence with the standard stated in the case

14

law of the general rules to the extent of a prescriptive

15

easement is measured and limited by its historical use during

16

the prescriptive period.

17

that's from the Judd decision that's kind of the black letter

18

standard in this area and I'd like to be able to argue it.

19
20
21

THE COURT:

That's from Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald,

I'm sorry.

What do you want me to add?

What are the words you want me to add?
MR. RAMPTON:

The general rule is that the extent of

22

a prescriptive easement is measured and limited by its

23

historic use during the prescriptive period.

24
25

THE COURT:

(Inaudible)

Well, I thought I got that with taking

in the third paragraph, taking into account the historic use

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188
001749
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1
2

and shape of the roadway during its 20 years of use.
MR. RAMPTON:

I understand that and it--it--I agree

3

it covers the substance of it but I think the jury ought to

4

hear the legal standard that they're operating under, because

5

I'd like to be able to read that, too, and--and argue it.

6

THE COURT:

Well, sorry.

And there are--there are

7

lots of words and lots of opinions over the years and I--I

8

don't think I can give them every one of those words.

9

done the best I could to--to cull from each opinion that you

10
11

presented to me and maybe-MS. ROGERS:

I am going to object to that because I

12

don't think that it is the only legal standard.

13

back to this Lent vs. Lance case--

14

So I've

THE COURT:

And we go

Which is why I also say you should

15

determine what is reasonably necessary from the facts and

16

circumstances of this case for Spah and Hollands to access

17

their property.

18

MS. ROGERS:

19

THE COURT:

Right.
I'm--I'm giving this jury two--two

20

different things that the Courts of Appeals have said in this

21

state in different cases and letting them run with it.

22

maybe what I could do is I could say, this is it, this is what

23

you're supposed to do, you're supposed to--I could--Mr.

24

Rampton would be thrilled if I would say you must determine

25

what is the smallest width of the roadway that they--that they

Now,

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1

used during the entire 20-year period.

2

roadway.

3

That's it.

That's the

Or I could say what you want me to say, which is you

4

should determine what is the largest width that they need in

5

order to be able to do whatever they have ever done and what

6

are they likely to need to do in the future.

7
8

MS. ROGERS:
to be more emphasized.

9
10

Well I just don't want one or the other

THE COURT:

And I think you--

I've given them both in the same

sentence.

11

MS. ROGERS:

12

THE COURT:

--I think you-To determine what is reasonably

13

necessary from the facts and circumstances of this case, which

14

I get from one opinion for the Spahs and Hollands to access

15

their property and then from another case, taking into account

16

the historic use and shape of the roadway during its 20 years

17

of use.

18

MS. ROGERS:

But now, Mr. Rampton wants more.

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. ROGERS:

21

you don't have to give us more.

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. ROGERS:

24

settle disputes amongst; right?

25

THE COURT:

And I'm not going to give it to him.
Okay.

Okay.

If you don't give him more then

28--

Good things you had a million kids to

--I think has not--has not changed from

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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§ 5:16.Continuous and uninterrupted use—Uninterrupted use, The Law of Easements &...

The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land § 5:16
The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land | March 2019 Update
Jon W. Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr.
Chapter 5. Creation of Easements by Prescription

§ 5:16. Continuous and uninterrupted use—Uninterrupted use

References

West's Key Number Digest
•

West's Key Number Digest, Easements

7

The landowner may interrupt an adverse usage by asserting ownership before the prescriptive period has expired. 1
Actions by a third person do not interrupt an adverse usage because they do not represent an assertion of dominion by
the owner. 2 Moreover, brief interruptions caused by natural forces or construction projects do not negate continuity
of usage. 3
In jurisdictions adhering to the adverse use theory of prescription, 4 there must be an actual physical interference with
the claimant's use. 5 The landowner must erect physical obstacles or otherwise use the servient parcel in such a way as
to prevent, at least temporarily, the adverse use. 6 It is not sufficient merely to attempt an interruption 7 or to render
the use less convenient. 8 The obstruction must in fact interfere with the claimant's usage. 9 Thus, the erection of gates
during the prescriptive period is immaterial where they do not prevent a claimant from using a road. 10 Moreover,
use of land by the owner for the same purpose as the claimant does not constitute an interruption. 11 A number of
jurisdictions, however, have taken the position that action by the servient owner, such as erecting physical barriers,
amounts to sufficient interruption even if such action ultimately failed to halt the adverse use. 12
The prevailing view is that a mere protest by the owner, whether oral or written, will not interrupt an adverse usage. 13
Indeed, complaints may strengthen the conclusion that the claimant's use was hostile. 14
There is also authority that a belated grant of permission by the owner after the adverse use has commenced does not
affect the running of the prescriptive period. 15 It is arguable, however, that such a grant of permission undercuts the
adverse character of a claimant's usage. 16 This is certainly the case if the adverse claimant accepts the landowner's
permission to use the servient property. 17 Similarly, it has been held that an express agreement giving permission to

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

1

§ 5:16.Continuous and uninterrupted use—Uninterrupted use, The Law of Easements &...

use a driveway interrupted adverse usage. 18 Clearly, permission granted after the prescriptive period has expired has
no legal effect. 19
Several jurisdictions have enacted statutes that enable a landowner to give persons using the owner's land written notice
of an intention to dispute any claim arising from such use. 20 This notice constitutes an interruption, preventing the
acquisition of any prescriptive right. 21 Upon receiving such a notice, the claimant may bring an action against the
landowner for disturbing the claimant's right to use the land. 22 Legislation of this character is an appropriate solution
to the landowner's dilemma in obtaining protection against prescriptive easements. 23 It avoids both the potential for
violent confrontation and the uncertainty implicit in the requirement of actual interruption 24 as well as the expense of
instituting a lawsuit. Of course, a statutory notice of interruption filed after the prescriptive period has run cannot divest
the claimant of a prescriptive easement. 25
In addition to actually obstructing adverse usage or giving notice pursuant to a statutory scheme, a landowner may
interrupt the use by instituting successful legal proceedings. The filing of an action by a landowner against whom the
statute of limitations is running will interrupt the prescriptive period if the lawsuit results in a judgment that the use
was improper. 26 Such judgment relates back to the start of the proceedings, and it is irrelevant that no cessation of use
actually occurs. 27 A dismissed or abandoned action, however, does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. 28
Similarly, the finding of a petition to register title to a parcel of land interrupts the riping of a claimed prescriptive
easement. 29
The conveyance of the servient estate does not interrupt the prescriptive period. 30 A subsequent owner takes the land
subject to the ripening easement. 31

Westlaw. © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Footnotes
1

2

3

Stiefel v. Lindemann, 33 Conn. App. 799, 811, 638 A.2d 642, 649 (1994) ("The owner of the servient
estate over which the right-of-way is used may interrupt the use by committing an act that breaks its
continuity."); O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590, 617, 703 S.E.2d 561, 588 (2010) (quoting this treatise).
The servient owner must interrupt the adverse use during the prescriptive period. Westpac Aspen
Investments, LLC v. Residences at Little Nell Development, LLC, 284 P.3d 131, 136 (Colo. App.
2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 3292842 (Colo. 2012) (prescriptive footpath easement established before
alleged interruption); Smith v. Chamblin Properties, LLC, 201 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.
2006) (actions to block access to parking lot did not occur until prescriptive period had passed); Fyfe
v. Tabor Turnpost, L.L.C., 22 Neb. App. 711, 720, 860 N.W.2d 415, 424–425 (2015) (interruption of
water through irrigation lateral took place after prescriptive period had passed); Kessinger v. Sharpe,
71 A.D.3d 1377, 898 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382-383 (4th Dep't 2010) (fence blocking use of driveway erected
after prescriptive period had run); Rotenberger v. Burghduff, 2007 SD 19, 729 N.W.2d 175, 180 (S.D.
2007) (interruption of trail usage after prescriptive period had passed was ineffective). See §§ 5:17 to
5:22 (defining prescriptive period).
Shuggars v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 46, 234 A.2d 752, 758 (1967) (placing posts across driveway by person
other than servient owner did not constitute interruption); Tuf Flight Industries, Inc. v. Harris, 129
S.W.3d 486, 489 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2004); O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590, 617, 703 S.E.2d 561,
588 (2010) (quoting this treatise). See 4 Tiffany, Law of Real Property (3d ed.) § 1205.
Jordan v. Bailey, 113 Nev. 1038, 1047, 944 P.2d 828, 834 (1997); O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590,
617, 703 S.E.2d 561, 588 (2010) (quoting this treatise).

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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4
5

6

7

8

9

See § 5:1 (differentiating between lost grant and adverse use theories of prescription).
Jesurum v. WBTSCC Limited Partnership, 169 N.H. 469, 151 A.3d 949, 959 (2016); Margoline v.
Holefelder, 420 Pa. 544, 546, 218 A.2d 227, 228 (1966) ("In order for the continuity of adverse use to
be interrupted, the obstruction must be in fact an interruption and must be accomplished with that
intent."); see also Wehde v. Regional Transp. Authority, 237 Ill. App. 3d 664, 680, 178 Ill. Dec. 190, 604
N.E.2d 446, 458 (2d Dist. 1992). For subsequent history, see Wehde v. Regional Transp. Authority,
284 Ill. App. 3d 297, 220 Ill. Dec. 26, 672 N.E.2d 843 (2d Dist. 1996). See generally What will disprove
acquiescence by owner essential to easement by prescription in case of known use, 5 A.L.R. 1325,
1328–1330.
Kelley v. Westover, 56 Ark. App. 56, 58–60, 938 S.W.2d 235, 235–237 (1997) (landowner protested
verbally and engaged in a series of overt acts, such as placing barbed wire across road, to interrupt
adverse usage); Serrano v. Grissom, 213 Cal. App. 2d 300, 305–306, 28 Cal. Rptr. 579, 582 (5th Dist.
1963) (servient owner plowed up road and farmed land); Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 550-552
(Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (landowner interrupted adverse use of driveway by construction of large earthen
berm which prevented use for three days); Stiefel v. Lindemann, 33 Conn. App. 799, 811, 638 A.2d
642, 649–650 (1994) (servient owner interrupted adverse use by installing fence across right-of-way and
planting shrubbery); Denardo v. Stanton, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 365, 906 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2009),
review denied, 454 Mass. 1108, 910 N.E.2d 909 (2009) (landowner placed boulders across road which
blocked vehicle access but not foot traffic, and such action was insufficient to prevent acquisition of
prescriptive easement for pedestrian travel on road); Biddix v. McConnell, 911 So. 2d 468, 477-478
(Miss. 2005) (landowners interrupted adverse use by removal of boundary stakes); Ray v. Nansel,
2002 MT 191, 311 Mont. 135, 144, 53 P.3d 870, 876 (2002) (landowner interrupted adverse use of
wastewater ditch by blocking ditch); Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v.
State ex rel. Rhodes, 329 N.C. 37, 49-54, 404 S.E.2d 677, 686–687 (1991); Pittman v. Lowther, 363 S.C.
47, 52, 610 S.E.2d 479, 481 (2005) ("We conclude actions are sufficient to interrupt the prescriptive
period when the servient landowner engages in overt acts, such as erecting physical barriers, which
cause a discontinuance of the dominant landowner's use of the land, no matter how brief."); Schilling
v. Backer, 2004 SD 45, 678 N.W.2d 802, 803 (S.D. 2004) (landowner interrupted adverse use of road
by erecting fence); Ormiston v. Boast, 68 Wash. 2d 548, 551, 413 P.2d 969, 971 (1966) (landowner
interrupted adverse use by placing fence across road). See also Rice v. Miller, 306 Minn. 523, 525–526,
238 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1976) (finding continuity broken when landowner erected barriers across beach
access road for several months each year and engaged in other acts asserting dominion that effectively
halted vehicular traffic, although not stopping pedestrians entirely); Weir v. Gibbs, 46 A.D.3d 1192,
1194, 849 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (3d Dep't 2007) (landowner erected successive obstacles to impede vehicular
and pedestrian traffic on roadway); Bouton v. Williams, 42 A.D.3d 795, 795–796, 839 N.Y.S.2d 350,
351–352 (3d Dep't 2007) (noting that “a substantial physical barrier that successfully interrupts use
for any period of time stops the running of the prescriptive period”).
Frech v. Piontkowski, 296 Conn. 43, 58, 994 A.2d 84, 94 (2010) (intermittent attempts by landowner
to prevent recreational use of reservoir and posting “No Trespassing” signs which claimants removed
were not sufficient to interrupt continuous use); Margoline v. Holefelder, 420 Pa. 544, 546, 218 A.2d
227, 228 (1966) (blockade of driveway for two days did not constitute actual interruption when there
was no evidence of attempted use).
Brown v. Ware, 129 Ariz. 249, 251 n.2, 630 P.2d 545, 547 n.2 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1981) (stringing barbed
wire across a roadway deemed insufficient to interrupt usage when barrier was knocked down one day
later); South Norwalk Lodge, No. 709, Benev. & Protective Order of Elks, Inc. v. Palco Hats, Inc.,
140 Conn. 370, 374, 100 A.2d 735, 737 (1953) (claimant repeatedly removed barriers from right-ofway and continued use); King v. Corsini, 32 Ill. App. 3d 461, 466, 335 N.E.2d 561, 565 (3d Dist. 1975)
(acts by landowner blocking road for short periods did not interrupt public use); Posnick v. Herd, 241
A.D.2d 783, 784–785, 660 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (3d Dep't 1997) (temporary parking of vehicles across
right-of-way did not effectively interfere with claimant's use).
Jesurum v. WBTSCC Limited Partnership, 169 N.H. 469, 481, 151 A.3d 949, 959 (2016) (finding no
evidence that landowner interrupted adverse use of parking area); Concerned Citizens of Brunswick
County Taxpayers Ass'n v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 329 N.C. 37, 54, 404 S.E.2d 677, 687 (1991); Reed v.

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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10

11

12

13

14

Piedimonte, 138 A.D.2d 937, 937, 526 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274 (4th Dep't 1988) (no evidence that erection
of temporary barriers "ever effectively interfered with, or disturbed, plaintiff's continuous use of the
driveway").
Wilkins v. Nieberger, 303 Ky. 662, 666, 198 S.W.2d 986, 989 (1947) (erection of gates across passway
"in itself is not inconsistent with the acquiring of an easement"); Brown v. Redfern, 541 S.W.2d
725, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Keefer v. Jones, 467 Pa. 544, 548, 359 A.2d 735, 738 (1976). There
is authority, however, that the installation of locked gates during the prescriptive period by the
landowner interrupts adverse use. Amerimont, Inc. v. Gannett, 278 Mont. 314, 324, 924 P.2d 1326,
1333 (1996) (erection of locked gate by landowner interrupted claim of adverse use because claimant
requested key to continue usage); Garrett v. Mueller, 144 Or. App. 330, 337–340, 927 P.2d 612, 616–
618 (1996) (finding that erection of locked gate was sufficient to interrupt adverse use of roadway, and
expressing concern that requiring physical action to halt adverse usage would invite breaches of peace).
Elmer v. Rodgers, 106 N.H. 512, 515, 214 A.2d 750, 752 (1965); see also Wehde v. Regional Transp.
Authority, 237 Ill. App. 3d 664, 680, 178 Ill. Dec. 190, 604 N.E.2d 446, 458 (2d Dist. 1992). For
subsequent history, see Wehde v. Regional Transp. Authority, 284 Ill. App. 3d 297, 220 Ill. Dec. 26,
672 N.E.2d 843 (2d Dist. 1996).
Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 550-552 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (declaring that "a barrier established
for the purpose of, and in fact, interrupting an adverse claimant's use is effective even if it is ultimately
removed by the adverse claimant", and asserting that this approach "comports with Colorado's policy
of favoring the record owner"); Allen v. Thomas, 209 S.W.3d 475, 480–481 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), review
denied, (Jan. 18, 2007) (erecting fences and placing large rocks at roadway entrance to block access,
and posting “No Trespassing” signs constituted interruption of prescriptive period even if efforts were
ignored); Pittman v. Lowther, 363 S.C. 47, 51-52, 610 S.E.2d 479, 481 (2005) (declining to adopt
approach adopted in Concerned Citizens, and holding that landowner's repeated attempts to prevent
claimant's use of roadway were sufficient to constitute interruption, despite fact claimant drove around
or destroyed obstacles).
Jackson v. City of Auburn, 971 So. 2d 696, 704 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), judgment aff'd, 971 So. 2d
712 (Ala. 2007) (finding that protest letters were not sufficient to interrupt adverse use, and declaring
that “failing to do anything other than send letters or make ‘ineffective protests’ would likely not
be sufficient in most jurisdictions”); Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 553 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006)
("[I]nterruption does not occur where a landowner merely gives notice to the occupant of land that
he or she is not entitled to use the land."); City of Derby v. Di Yanno, 142 Conn. 708, 711, 118
A.2d 308, 310 (1955) (prescriptive easement established where roadway was used in disregard of "No
Trespassing" sign); Hoffman v. United Iron and Metal Co., Inc., 108 Md. App. 117, 137, 671 A.2d
55, 65 (1996) ("Mere complaints, however, will not prevent the acquisition of a right by prescription
without an abandonment or interruption in the use."); Johnston v. Bates, 778 S.W.2d 357, 364 (Mo.
Ct. App. E.D. 1989); Ellison v. Fellows, 121 N.H. 978, 982, 437 A.2d 278, 280 (1981); Thompson v.
Schuh, 286 Or. 201, 209 n.5, 593 P.2d 1138, 1143 n.5 (1979); Huff v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 38 Wash.
2d 103, 113, 228 P.2d 121, 127 (1951); O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590, 618, 703 S.E.2d 561, 589 (2010)
("[M]ere unheeded requests, protests, objections, or threats of prosecution or litigation by a landowner
that the claimant stop are insufficient to interrupt an adverse usage."). See also 4 Tiffany, Law of Real
Property (3d ed.) § 1206; Note, Establishment of Prescriptive Easements in Arizona, 23 Ariz. L. Rev.
1487, 1496–1497 (1981). But see § 5:24 (treating protest under lost grant theory of prescription).
Rhode Island adheres to the position that a landowner can halt the prescriptive period from running
by affirmatively communicating objections to the adverse use. Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc.,
112 A.3d 703, 710 (R.I. 2015) (landowner's continuous objections to adverse use of property defeated
claimed prescriptive easement); Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 826, 832 (R.I.
2001).
Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N.J.L. 605, 629-631, 1881 WL 8341 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1881);
Sieber v. White, 1961 OK 220, 366 P.2d 755, 759 (Okla. 1961); Pedersen v. Washington State Dept. of
Transp., 43 Wash. App. 413, 418, 717 P.2d 773, 776 (Div. 1 1986); O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590,
618, 703 S.E.2d 561, 589 (2010) (quoting this treatise).
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17

18

19

20

21
22
23

Huff v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 38 Wash. 2d 103, 113, 228 P.2d 121, 127 (1951). See also Wilson v.
McElyea, 815 So. 2d 462, 464-465 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (declaring that "the owner of the servient
estate may not change the character of use that began as hostile under a claim of right by the simple
act of unilaterally granting permission for future use since the character of the use is more properly
determined from the standpoint of the use and not the owner of the servient estate").
See Bookchin v. Maraconda, 162 A.D.2d 393, 394, 557 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (1st Dep't 1990) (letter granting
permission to use driveway ended running of prescriptive period); Granston v. Callahan, 52 Wash.
App. 288, 296, 759 P.2d 462, 466–467 (Div. 1 1988).
J.F. Gioia, Inc. v. Cardinal American Corp., 23 Ohio App. 3d 33, 38, 491 N.E.2d 325, 331 (8th Dist.
Cuyahoga County 1985) ("By accepting its neighbor's permission to use the drive, plaintiff accepted
the neighbor's superior right and abandoned adversity for that property … . That action extinguished
any maturing prescriptive right by destroying the continuity between any prior adverse use and any
subsequent adverse use.").
Granston v. Callahan, 52 Wash. App. 288, 296, 759 P.2d 462, 466–467 (Div. 1 1988). See also Bookchin
v. Maraconda, 162 A.D.2d 393, 394, 557 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (1st Dep't 1990) (letter granting permission
to use driveway ended running of prescriptive period).
Arrechea Family Trust v. Adams, 960 So. 2d 501, 503–506 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied,
959 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 2007) (permission to use driveway granted after prescriptive period had run
was ineffective); Phillips v. Sommerer, 917 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1996) (request for
permission does not destroy prescriptive right already established); Gault v. Bahm, 826 S.W.2d 875,
882 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1992) (requests for permission have no effect after acquisition of prescriptive
easement); Behen v. Elliott, 791 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1990); Bonardi v. Kazmirchuk,
146 N.H. 640, 643, 776 A.2d 1282, 1285 (2001); Sander v. McKinley, 241 Or. App. 297, 307, 250 P.3d
939, 946 (2011); Community Feed Store, Inc. v. Northeastern Culvert Corp., 151 Vt. 152, 161, 559
A.2d 1068, 1073 (1989).
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47-38; Ind. Code Ann. §§ 32-5-1-2 to 32-5-1-4; Iowa Code Ann. §§ 564.4–564.7;
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 812; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 187 § 3; RI Gen. Laws § 34-7-6. See
Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 275 Conn. 105, 127-131, 881 A.2d 937, 953-955 (2005), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S. Ct. 1913, 164 L. Ed. 2d 664 (2006) (discussing Conn. Stat. § 47-38, and
holding that boundary line agreement did not constitute notice of intent to prevent acquisition of
prescriptive easement); Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 593–596, 711 A.2d 682, 687–688 (1998)
(discussing Conn. Stat. § 47-38, and finding that injunction against claimant should have same effect
as statutory notice scheme and preclude acquisition of prescriptive easement); Dowley v. Morency,
1999 ME 137, 737 A.2d 1061, 1069–1070 (Me. 1999) (discussing statutory method for preventing
acquisition of prescriptive easement); see also South Norwalk Lodge, No. 709, Benev. & Protective
Order of Elks, Inc. v. Palco Hats, Inc., 140 Conn. 370, 374, 100 A.2d 735, 737 (1953) (landowner's
failure to utilize statutory notice to prevent prescriptive right noted as factor in establishing easement);
Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d 606, 607 (Me. 1989) (landowner served notice to halt acquisition of
prescriptive easement to use sewer pipe); O'Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d 1039, 1041 n.2 (Me. 1987)
(landowner posted notice to prevent acquisition of prescriptive easement).
Rhode Island adheres to the position that a landowner can halt the prescriptive period from running
by affirmatively communicating objections to the adverse use. Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc.,
112 A.3d 703, 710 (R.I. 2015) (landowner's continuous objections to adverse use of property defeated
claimed prescriptive easement); Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 826, 832 (R.I.
2001).
See sources cited note 19.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47-41; Iowa Code Ann. § 564.8; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 187, § 4; RI Gen.
Laws § 34-7-7.
Questioning the soundness of the actual interference doctrine, one commentator has observed: "An
oral or written complaint, however, might very well suffice to notify the user of this intention. If
notification is properly proven in court, it should be no less convincing than showing one has placed
debris in the road." Note, Establishment of Prescriptive Easements in Arizona, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1487,
1497 (1981).
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See, e.g., Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 552 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) ("[R]equiring owners to preserve a
sufficient barrier for any extended period of time against the efforts of the adverse user to remove and
defeat it invites confrontation, which can be unpleasant, violent, dangerous, and in some instances even
deadly."); Thomas v. Barnum, 211 Mont. 137, 141, 684 P.2d 1106, 1109 (1984) (overruled by, Warnack
v. Coneen Family Trust, 266 Mont. 203, 879 P.2d 715 (1994)) (landowner threatened claimant); Smith
v. Bixby, 196 Neb. 235, 237, 242 N.W.2d 115, 117 (1976) (landowner fired shotgun at claimant's
vehicle); Garrett v. Mueller, 144 Or. App. 330, 337–340, 927 P.2d 612, 616–618 (1996) (expressing
concern that requiring physical action by landowner to interrupt adverse usage would invite breaches
of peace); Pittman v. Lowther, 363 S.C. 47, 52, 610 S.E.2d 479, 481 (2005) (voicing concern that
requiring "a servient landowner to take actions in addition to erecting barriers like fences and cables,
would encourage wrongful or potentially violent behavior that is contrary to sound public policy
considerations and the peaceful resolution of disputes").
Faught v. Edgewood Corners, Inc., 63 Conn. App. 164, 171 n.7, 772 A.2d 1142, 1148 n.7 (2001); BurkeTarr Co. v. Ferland Corp., 724 A.2d 1014, 1020 (R.I. 1999).
RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Mellon Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 436 F.2d 1297, 1301 n.14 (3d
Cir. 1970) ("An adverse use is uninterrupted when those against whom the use is adverse do not initiate
and bring to successful conclusion legal proceedings or otherwise cause a cessation of the use."); Miller
v. Grossman Shoes, Inc., 186 Conn. 229, 234, 440 A.2d 302, 305 (1982) (lawsuit "interrupted the period
of necessary continuous use"). See also 3 Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.10.
Restatement of Property § 459 cmt. c.

24

25
26

27
28

Yorba v. Anaheim Union Water Co., 41 Cal. 2d 265, 270, 259 P.2d 2, 5 (1953). See also Thompson
v. Ratcliff, 245 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Ky. 1952) (abandoned lawsuit does not affect continuity of adverse
possession).
Gifford v. Otis, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 211, 214, 873 N.E.2d 792, 795 (2007), review denied, 450 Mass.
1104, 877 N.E.2d 599 (2007).
Lindquist v. Weber, 404 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (servient property conveyed during
period in which prescriptive easement ripened); Matthews v. Dennis, 365 S.C. 245, 250, 616 S.E.2d
437, 440 (Ct. App. 2005); Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 521–522, 175 P.2d 714, 718, 170 A.L.R.
770 (1946). See also Hoffman v. United Iron and Metal Co., Inc., 108 Md. App. 117, 137–138, 671
A.2d 55, 65-66 (1996) (discussing but not resolving whether change in ownership of servient estate
affects prescriptive period).
See § 5:22 (discussing effect of transfer of servient estate on running of prescriptive period).
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